BRITAIN'S WEALTH EXPLOSION 'Britain's super-rich have seen their wealth soar into the stratosphere.` 1
Twenty years ago, Britain was one of the most equal countries in the developed world. Today it is one of the most unequal. 2 Having first fallen and then levelled off in the post-war era, the wealth gap between the rich and the poor began to rise again in the late 1980s and is now at levels not seen for over a generation.
It is a trend that has been driven by a remarkable revolution -a great surge in both the numbers of the mega-rich and in the level of their wealth. Whether we take the company boardroom, the deal-making entrepreneur or the investment banker, the story is the same -the super-rich have been getting richer at a much faster pace than the rest of the population. The number of billionaires in Britain -a mix of entrepreneurs, aristocrats, deal-makers and tax exiles -has more than tripled since 1990 while the number of people worth over £100 million has risen more than fivefold.
Since 1997, the number with 'liquid assets ` of more than £5 million has more than doubled to 9,000, despite the carnage of the 2000 stock market crash. Britain is now back to levels of pre-tax income inequality last seen at the end of the 1940s. Official figures for the share of wealth enjoyed by the top one per cent shows inequality back to levels of more than a generation ago. 4 The very wealthiest within the top one per cent are almost certainly enjoying wealth shares that take them back even earlier. Britain may not be back to the extreme levels of inequality that prevailed up to the 1920s when a tiny proportion of the population, a mix of the landed aristocracy and the new industrial and commercial barons, held an even greater share of the nation's wealth and income. But in those times, the constraints on wealth-making were much weaker, monopolies could operate largely unchecked, the Inland Revenue was in its infancy, unions were few and regulations minimal. It was a society in the process of transition and that degree of inequality was eventually to prove unsustainable.
What is surprising is how in today's much more mature democracy and complex and regulated economy, the top few thousand individuals are able to win such large shares of the economic wealth of the country. will set you back £320,000. A modern tycoon lifestyle certainly doesn't come cheap.
The emergence of the centi-millionaire class has spawned new industries including a rapidly expanding professional and very well paid servant class that looks after the mega rich. They research and provide expensive and exclusive holidays, they buy, deliver and construct the personal cellars to store the world's finest wines. They conduct the bidding to acquire the world's most expensive impressionists, postimpressionists, Picassos and Modiglinis. They organise the purchase of the yacht, the mansion and the private jet. For those who can't yet afford one of their own, you can always hire one for up to £400,000 a day from firms such as NetJets and Bookajet.
Britain has never been short of the very rich and the trappings that go along with London, one of the most expensive streets in Britain. Philip Green, the high street retailer has gone from nowhere to over £4 billion in little more than a decade. This is breakneck speed, bringing him billionaire status faster than anyone else in British history.
Britain's wealth explosion has strong roots in the parallel rush that has been occurring in the United States. There, the remarkable growth in wealth at the top over the last fifteen years has been likened by one expert to an 'economic megashift`. Philip Green owes his remarkable fortune to, first the way he built his capital base by asset-stripping companies like Sears as a springboard to taking Bhs and then Arcadia private and turning them around. 7 Others who have been enriched by the private equity revolution include Damon Buffini of Permira, Mike Smith of CVC and Martin
Halusa of Apax. The Economist has dubbed their pay 'gravity-defying`. 8 There are of course a variety of explanations -economic, technological, social and political -for the sharply rising shares of income and wealth enjoyed by the richest.
These differing explanations are all important, but there is one overarching change that lies behind it -a fundamental shift in our cultural and political attitudes towards the very rich. Without this change, inequality would not have risen at the rate that it has. It is certainly the case that the rewards that are increasingly commonplace today would not have been acceptable in the immediate post-war decades.
The fluctuating fortunes of the rich, and the poor, and the gap between them can be traced to the way in which the political and public climate and wider economic conditions interact. Governments can leave the issue of distribution alone or intervene to raise the floor or cap the ceiling. In the nineteenth century, the state largely left things alone. Spurred on by the opportunities created by the industrial revolution, the last decades of the century brought the first great wealth explosion in Britain, and along with it, an increase in the number of those with exceptionally large fortunes. In the opening years of the new century, the first breaks were applied. This brought some protection for the poorest, but did little to thwart the progress of the very rich. The spendthrift extravagance of the 'roaring twenties` contributed to the 1929 crash. This led to the first great reckoning for the rich with repercussions that lasted for more than a generation. The levels of inequality prevailing up to that time had, eventually, proved unsustainable. In the two or three decades after the crash, personal fortunes shrank, the breaks were applied much more firmly and the wealth gap narrowed. Twenty years ago, the typical chief executive of a FTSE 100 company earned some 25 times the pay of the average worker. Today it is close to 120 times. 11 This surge in the pay gap might be justified if it had been driven by a transformation in Britain's business performance. But this is decidedly not the case. One recent study from
Manchester University shows that top company heads have enjoyed pay increases that have greatly outstripped a range of measures of business performance. 'Valueskimming` is how the authors defined it. Their conclusion, that 'top managers in giant firms appear to be an averagely ineffectual officer class who do, however, know how to look after themselves`.
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The business magazine, Management Today, has condemned the growing gulf in pay as defying 'any sense of fairness`. Economists differ about the wider economic benefits of the merger boom of recent times, one fed and watered by the investment banks in search of ever-rising profits.
'Merge or die` was often the rallying cry to company executives. The evidence is strong, however, that the main effect of mergers has been to achieve wealth redistribution from the buying firm to the selling firm and are as likely to destroy as create value. The merger of AOL and Time Warner in 2000, designed to create a world-class modern media company rather led to some of the largest losses in corporate history. One study of the impact of recent mergers in the UK, US and continental Europe concluded that ' shareholders of acquirers experience wealth losses on average or at best break even… The odds of positive and significant value creation for acquirer shareholders may even be less than 50%, which is what would get with the toss of a fair coin.` 15 What all merger and acquisition activity has in common, of course, are the massive fees and bonuses generated for the investment banks and directors involved. Those who clinch the deals nearly always walk away enriched and unharmed, whatever the outcome.
One former banker has described the finance industry as 'bloated and parasitic`. 16 Philip Augar, a former top executive at Schroders has described the money paid to brokers 'a social and moral disgrace`. 17 Financial speculation, the source of many modern fortunes, is rarely associated with creating value. As one leading figure in the hedge fund industry has admitted, 'when I first went into the City, I could not believe that anyone would want to pay me so much for creating nothing`. In 1998, the chief More than 100 years ago, the business financier and guru, JP Morgan -then one of the most powerful men in America -argued that executives should earn no more than twenty times the pay of the lowest paid company employee. In his 1943 essay, 'The Lion and the Unicorn`, George Orwell recommended a maximum differential of 15:1. Franklin D Roosevelt and JK Galbraith have also argued for limits between the top and the bottom. In the post-war decades differentials between the broad mass of workers and their bosses were much closer to these levels than they are today, where in some companies they stand at several hundred to one or even more.
There is, of course, nothing new about the issue of the role and merits of the rich.
The wealthiest have inspired and annoyed in equal measure throughout history. What is new is the tearing up of the post-war contract, a kind of deal that led to what some have called 'the great levelling`. The age of egalitarianism now seems to have been somewhat short-lived. We now appear to be in a new and wholly different era, one in which we are returning to much higher levels of wealth concentration, one much more accepting of growing inequality, one much closer to American than European social norms.
Successive and welcome attempts to encourage a new enterprise culture would, we were promised, lead to a process of 'trickle down' that would, ultimately, benefit us all.
In fact, what has happened is that the rich and the super-rich have taken an increasingly disproportionate share of the nation's wealth. The bottom half of the population, meanwhile has experienced a fall in the share of its wealth from ten per cent in 1986 to six per cent in 2002. We in an age of ' trickle up' rather than 'trickle down 
